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Notes and Comments
Justice for All (The Wrong Reasons):
The Flaws and Fallout of Berman v.
Sitrin
Joshua Dunn*
INTRODUCTION
"Just as 'bad facts make bad law,"'lit is also true that "tragic
facts make bad law."2 This maxim was unfortunately illustrated
perfectly by the recent Rhode Island Supreme Court decision in
Berman v. Sitrin.3  Berman involved a young man on his
honeymoon in Newport, Rhode Island, who was rendered a
quadriplegic after falling approximately twenty-nine feet when
the ground upon which he was standing suddenly gave way
beneath his feet.4 This tragic fall occurred while the young couple
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2012;
B.A., University of Rhode Island, 2009. The author would like to thank
Tanya Monestier, Cecily Banks, and Michael Field for all of their thoughtful
insight and truly helpful feedback given throughout the drafting process.
Many thanks also go out to Jessica Shelton and the Notes & Comments team,
the Articles Editors, and the Law Review staff members who greatly assisted
in the final preparation of this Note for publication.
1. Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1217 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
3. 991 A.2d 1038, 1056 (R.I. 2010) (Suttell, C.J., dissenting) ("[i]f ever
there was a case to which one could apply the ancient maxim 'Dura lex sed
lex' ('The law is hard but it is the law'), it surely would be this case.").
4. Id. at 1042.
305
306 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 16:305
was walking on the Cliff Walk, a famed Newport tourist attraction
that runs along the Atlantic coast.5 The young man brought a
negligence suit against the City of Newport and the City claimed
immunity under the Rhode Island Recreational Use Statute
(RUS),6 which provides limited liability to landowners that make
their land available to the public for recreational purposes. 7
Before the Court decided Berman, two general suppositions
regarding the RUS and its 1996 amendment 8 seemed to hold true.
First, the RUS would often operate to prevent a severely injured
individual from being compensated for his or her injuries by a
municipal or state landowner, even in a tragic factual scenario.
Second, the Court would faithfully interpret and apply the RUS,
even though it made no secret of its disdain for that statute. The
validity of both of these assumptions was seriously compromised
by the Court's decision in Berman. To the surprise of the Rhode
Island legal community - and two Justices - the Court, relying
heavily on the particular factual circumstances of the case,
determined that one of the exceptions to the limited liability
provisions of the RUS applied to deny the City's claimed RUS
defense. 9
This Note argues that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
results-based reasoning in Berman was contrary to the plain
language of the RUS and well-established precedent. In addition,
the decision will lead to undesirable results contrary to the
legislative intent behind the RUS. The proper method of
rectifying the unjust results that are often reached as a result of
limiting the liability of state and municipal landowners under the
RUS is legislative amendment of the RUS, not strained
interpretation of the statute by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Part I of this Note discusses the passage of the RUS and the
Court's pre-Berman precedent on this statute. Part II sets forth
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in the Berman
case. Part III argues that the Berman majority's interpretation
and application of the RUS is fundamentally flawed. Part IV
explains the likely negative implications that will stem from the
5. Id. at 1041-42.
6. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 32-6-1 to -6 (1994).
7. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1042-43.
8. 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws 1228.
9. See Berman, 991 A.2d at 1053.
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Berman decision. Finally, Part V suggests that legislative
amendment is the only legitimate method of fixing the problems
with the RUS as it is currently enacted.
I. HAVE FUN AT YOUR OWN RISK: THE STATE OF LANDOWNER
LIABILITY LAW PRIOR To BERMAN
A. The Recreational Use Statute
In 1978, the Rhode Island General Assembly passed sections
32-6-1 to 32-6-7 of the Rhode Island General Laws,10 commonly
referred to as the Recreational Use Statute. The RUS's stated
purpose is "to encourage owners of land to make land and water
areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting
their liability to persons entering thereon for those purposes." 11
To effectuate this purpose the RUS provides, in pertinent part,
that:
[A]n owner of land who either directly or indirectly
invites or permits without charge any person to use that
property for recreational purposes does not thereby:
(1) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for
any purpose;
(2) Confer upon that person the legal status of an invitee
or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; nor
(3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any
injury to any person or property caused by an act of [sic]
omission of that person. 12
Originally, the term "owner" as used in the RUS was defined as
10. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-6-1 to -7 (1994). Section 32-6-7 of the Rhode
Island General Laws was subsequently repealed by 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws
1229.
11. R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-1 (1994). The term "recreational purposes" is
defined elsewhere in the RUS to include numerous activities such as
"hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, horseback
riding, bicycling, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, water sports,
viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites, and all
other recreational purposes contemplated by this chapter[.]" Id. § 6-2(4).
12. Id. § 32-6-3.
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"the possessor of a fee interest, tenant, lessee, occupant, or person
in control of the premises.'13 However, in 1996 the General
Assembly amended the definition of "owner" as used in the RUS to
include the state and municipalities. 14 The RUS qualifies its
limitation on liability by stating, in relevant part, that:
Nothing in this chapter limits in any way any liability
which, but for this chapter, otherwise exists:
(1) For the willful or malicious failure to guard or warn
against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity
after discovering the user's peril[.] 15
The phrase "after discovering the user's peril" as used in the RUS
mirrors language from the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
articulation of the duty owed by a landowner to a trespasser. In
Boday v. N. Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co.,16 the Court stated
that "[i]t is the generally accepted rule that a [landowner] owes no
duty to a trespasser or bare licensee on its premises except after
discovering his peril[.]' 7 The Court in Zoubra v. N.Y, New
Haven & Hartford R.R. Co.18 made clear that actual discovery of a
particular trespasser in a position of peril is necessary to trigger a
duty: "the law does not impose upon the [landowner] any duty
toward the plaintiff as a trespasser or bare licensee unless [the
landowner] has first discovered [the trespasser] in a position of
13. 1978 R.I. Pub. Laws 1288-89.
14. 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws 1229. The definition of "owner" now reads:
.'[o]wner' means the private owner possessor of a fee interest, or tenant,
lessee, occupant, or person in control of the premises including the state and
municipalities[.]" R.I. GEN. LAWS § 32-6-2(3) (Supp. 2010).
15. Id. § 32-6-5(a)(1). The RUS also contains one other exception to its
limitation on liability. The RUS does not operate to immunize an owner:
(2) [f]or any injury suffered in any case where the owner of land
charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the
recreational use thereof; except that in the case of land leased to the
state or a subdivision thereof, any consideration received by the
owner for that lease shall not be deemed a "charge" within the
meaning of this section.
Id. § 32-6-5(a)(2).
16. 165 A. 448 (R.I. 1933).
17. Id. at 448. The Boday Court also made clear that the mere fact that
members of the public frequently came upon a particular portion of the
premises where the plaintiff was injured did not change this general rule. Id.
at 449.
18. 150 A.2d 643 (R.I. 1959).
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danger."19 The Court followed this rule without variation until
1975, when it abandoned the traditional land entrant
classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser in favor of a rule
requiring a landowner to use "reasonable care for the safety of all
persons reasonably expected to be on upon his premises." 20 Just
three years later, the General Assembly enacted the RUS
containing the "after discovering the user's peril" language and
the Court explained in Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co.21
that "the obvious intention of the Legislature [in enacting the
RUS] was to treat those who use private property for recreational
purposes as though they were trespassers."22
B. Decidedly Unenthusiastic: The Court's Interpretation of the
Recreational Use Statute
From the 2000 decision in Cain v. Johnson23 right up until
the 2010 decision in Berman v. Sitrin,24 three overarching
principles were revealed in the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
RUS jurisprudence. 25 First, the Court has repeatedly recognized
that the intention of the General Assembly in enacting the RUS
was to treat those using private property for recreational purposes
as trespassers, meaning that no duty on the part of the landowner
arises "until after the trespasser has been discovered in a position
of peril."26 Second, the Court has consistently held that the
language of the RUS is unambiguous. 27  Third, and most
19. Id. at 645. Earlier in the same opinion, the Court noted that the
landowner "owed [the plaintiff] no duty except not to willfully or wantonly
injure her after actually discovering her peril." Id. at 644-45 (emphasis
added).
20. Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d 127, 133 (R.I. 1975).
21. 637 A.2d 1056 (R.I. 1994).
22. Id. at 1060.
23. 755 A.2d 156 (R.I. 2000).
24. 991 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 2010).
25. Despite the fact that the General Assembly passed the RUS in 1978,
the Court did not interpret the statute in any depth until the last decade.
26. Cain, 755 A.2d at 162, 164; see also Morales v. Town of Johnston, 895
A.2d 721, 730 (R.I. 2006) (discussing the "clear intent of the recreational use
statute"); Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 713 (R.I. 2003) (quoting
Tantimonico, 637 A.2d at 1060) (explaining "obvious intention of the
Legislature" in enacting RUS).
27. Labedz v. State, 919 A.2d 415, 417 (R.I. 2007); Cruz v. City of
Providence, 908 A.2d 405, 407 (R.I. 2006); Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455,
457-58 (R.I. 2006); Hanley, 837 A.2d at 712.
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important, the Court has repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction
about what it perceives as the unjust results that often occur
under the RUS framework. In fact, on numerous occasions the
Court has implored the General Assembly to remove the state and
municipalities from the definition of "owner" under the RUS.28 A
brief discussion of the Court's RUS precedent follows.
Although not decided under the RUS framework,29 Cain
established that the RUS is a legislative codification of the Court's
common law trespasser rule.30 Having facts strikingly similar to
those in Berman,31 Cain involved a tragic injury occurring on the
Cliff Walk in Newport, Rhode Island. 32 On August 6, 1991 at
approximately 2 a.m., Cain and two friends were walking on the
portion of the Cliff Walk near Salve Regina University when Cain
stepped off of the paved walk onto a grassy area. 33 While Cain
was standing on this grassy area, the ground beneath his feet
gave way suddenly and he fell to his death.34 In the subsequent
wrongful death action brought against the City of Newport, the
State of Rhode Island, and Salve Regina University, "the motion
justice granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants."35
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held Cain was a
trespasser and that "a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser
unless the trespasser first is discovered in a position of peril."36
The Court rejected the plaintiffs contention that a duty of
reasonable care should be imposed where the landowner knows or
should know that trespassers constantly intrude upon the land,
explaining "[t]his theory, which turns on a landowner's knowledge
of the use of his land by trespassers... has not been accepted by
this Court."37 Pointing out that under the plaintiffs proposed rule
28. See Labedz, 919 A.2d at 417; Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035,
1042 (R.I. 2006); Cruz, 908 A.2d at 407 n.2; Lacey, 899 A.2d at 458.
29. Cain, 755 A.2d at 164. The Court did not decide this case under RUS
because the injury, which occurred in 1991, preceded the 1996 amendment
that extended the RUS's limitation on liability to lands owned or controlled
by the state or municipalities. Id. at 173 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part).
30. Id. at 164.
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. Cain, 755 A.2d at 158.
33. Id. at 158.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 159, 161.
37. Id. at 160-61.
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the distinction between a discovered and undiscovered trespasser
would be "irrelevant," the Court reiterated that "the law does not
impose upon a landowner any duty toward a trespasser unless
[the landowner] has first discovered [the trespasser] in a position
of peril, even though there was an allegation that the [landowner]
knew or should have known about the presence of people on the
[land] ."38
Although the Court decided Cain under the common law
trespasser rule and not under the RUS, the Court explained that
the result would be the same under the RUS: "[e]ven under the
statute, a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser unless the
trespasser is first discovered in a position of peril."39  The
limitation on landowner liability contained in the RUS the Court
held, "is simply a legislative codification of the common law that is
enunciated in our cases."40  Because Cain was not actually
discovered in a position of peril prior to his fatal fall, the Court
affirmed the motion justice's grant of summary judgment for all
defendants. 41
Dissenting, Justice Goldberg disagreed with the Court's
conclusion that Cain was a trespasser, finding instead that he was
an implied licensee by virtue of his being a tourist visitor to the
Cliff Walk.42 More importantly, Justice Goldberg chronicled the
City of Newport's persistent failure to improve safety on the Cliff
Walk despite extensive evidence of the latent dangers that the
walk posed to visitors. For instance, in 1987, a Salve Regina
University student fell from the Cliff Walk to his death.43 Despite
promises allegedly made to the student's family that a fence would
be erected in that particular area of the Cliff Walk, no such action
was taken.44  In addition, the President of Salve Regina
University implored the City both before and after the student's
38. Cain, 755 A.2d at 161.
39. Id. at 164.
40. Id.
41. Id. In fact, despite evidence that the City of Newport knew of the
latent dangers that the Cliff Walk posed to unsuspecting visitors, the Court
nevertheless concluded that "[albsolutely no evidence has been presented to
suggest that the defendants or any of them were aware of [Cain's] position of
peril." Id.
42. Id. at 169-70 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 166.
44. Cain, 755 A.2d. at 166-67.
312 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 16:305
death to erect a fence along the Cliff Walk where erosion had
significantly weakened the land on the ocean side of the walk.45
The City took no action in response. 46
Finally, despite a 1989 report by the National Park Service
that indicated that the Cliff Walk was in "desperate need of
improvement from a public-safety standpoint," describing a near-
fatal fall from the Cliff Walk in 1988, the City did not install a
fence or take any other safety measures. 47 Based on this history,
Justice Goldberg concluded that the State and the City of Newport
had "actual notice of the potential for loss of life posed by this
particular area of the Cliff Walk and did nothing to forestall this
calamity."48 Accordingly, Justice Goldberg would have vacated
the motion justice's grant of summary judgment for the State and
the City of Newport.49
Three years after its decision in Cain, the Court was asked to
interpret the 1996 amendment to the RUS in Hanley v. State.50
There, the plaintiff injured her arm and shoulder when she caught
her foot on the edge of an asphalt road and fell to the ground while
she was walking in a state park in Narragansett, Rhode Island.51
At trial, a motion justice entered summary judgment in favor of
the State on the grounds that the RUS barred suit against the
State. 52 Following the plaintiffs appeal, the Court addressed the
question of whether the RUS extends immunity to state-owned
public parks as a matter of first impression.53 The Court first
announced some of its general principles of statutory
interpretation, explaining that the Court's "ultimate goal is to give
effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature"54
and 'that when the language of a statute is clear and
45. Id. at 167.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 174. Justice Goldberg concluded that summary judgment in
favor of Salve Regina University was appropriate because the University had
no duty to maintain or repair the Cliff Walk and it neither owned nor
controlled the walk. Id. at 172-73.
50. 837 A.2d 707, 710 (R.I. 2003).
51. Id. at 709.
52. Id. at 710.
53. ld. at 710-11.
54. Id. at 711 (quoting Oliveira v. Lombardi, 794 A.2d 453, 457 (R.I.
2002)) (internal quotations omitted).
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unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and
must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary
meanings."'55 Applying these principles, the Court first concluded
that the language of the 1996 amendment was "unambiguous."56
Reiterating that "'the obvious intention of the Legislature [in
enacting the RUS] was to treat those who use private property for
recreational purposes as though they were trespassers,"' the Court
unanimously affirmed the motion justice's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the State.57
Three years later, in Lacey v. Reitsma,58 the Court revealed
the first glimpse of its frustration in being constrained to reach
unjust results under the RUS framework. 59 Lacey involved a
negligence action brought against the State by parents of a nine-
year-old boy, R.J., who had suffered severe injuries in a state park
in Newport, Rhode Island.60 R.J. was riding his bicycle in a part
of the park that bordered a twenty-foot cliff, which allegedly had
no protective device to prevent people from falling. 61 When his
bicycle veered off the cliff, R.J. fell to the rocks below.62 The
motion justice granted the State's motion for summary judgment,
concluding that the State was shielded from liability by the
RUS.63
On appeal, a unanimous Supreme Court "reluctantly"
affirmed. 64 The Court noted that the plaintiffs had "pointed to no
evidence that these defendants discovered young R.J. in a position
of peril and then failed to warn him against the potentially
dangerous condition."65  While emphasizing that the Court's
"empathy for that young man [R.J.] is very great," the Court held
that the "unambiguous language of the Recreational Use Statute
and the equally unambiguous nature of the relevant precedent"
55. Id. at 711-12 (quoting Oliveira, 794 A.2d at 457).
56. Hanley, 837 A.2d at 712.
57. Id. at 713-14 (quoting Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637
A.2d 1056, 1060 (R.I. 1994)).
58. 899 A.2d 455 (R.I. 2006).
59. See id. at 458.
60. Id. at 456.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 456-57.
64. Lacey, 899 A.2d at 458-59.
65. Id. at 458.
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compelled the Court to reach its conclusion that summary
judgment for the State was appropriate under the RUS.66
Before concluding the opinion, the Lacey Court offered the
first of what would become a series of pleas with the General
Assembly to amend the RUS to exclude the state and
municipalities from the definition of "owner":
While we are cognizant of the fact that our judicial role is
to interpret and apply statutes and not to legislate, it is
our view that it is entirely appropriate for us to suggest
that the General Assembly (whose role it is to legislate)
focus upon the result in this case. Perhaps the time has
come for the General Assembly to revisit the provisions of
the Recreational Use Statute, especially where public
parks and public recreational areas are concerned. We
wish respectfully, but forcefully, to state that we find it
troubling (to say the least) to be confronted with a legal
regime whereby the users of state and municipal
recreational sites must be classified for tort law purposes
"as though they were trespassers." The existing
Recreational Use Statute requires that such users be so
classified, whereas we are of the view that people who use
public recreational facilities should not be classified as
trespassers. 67
In Cruz v. City of Providence,68 the Court again expressed its
dissatisfaction with the provisions of the RUS that limit the
liability of state and municipal landowners. 69 In that case, two
boys were riding a bicycle (one pedaling the bike, one sitting on
the handlebars) in a public park owned by the City of Providence
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 713 (R.I. 2003)) (emphasis
in original) (internal citations omitted). In the same term as Lacey, the Court
decided Morales v. Town of Johnston, which involved the claims of a high
school soccer player who was injured during a high school game. 895 A.2d
721, 724 (R.I. 2006). Although the Court determined that the RUS was
inapplicable to student athletes "participating in an organized sport on a
designated athletic field," in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice
Goldberg, the Court reaffirmed that "[t]he clear intent of the recreational use
statute is to shield landowners against liability to those who come upon the
owner's land for recreation" by treating them as trespassers. Id. at 730.
68. 908 A.2d 405 (R.I. 2006).
69. Id. at 407 n.2.
2011] JUSTICE FOR ALL (THE WRONG REASONS)
when the boys ran into a chain that blocked a walkway. 70 The
boys could not see the chain because it allegedly blended in with a
chain link fence behind it.71 Both boys suffered injuries as a
result of running into the chain and falling off the bicycle. 72 In
the boys' negligence action against the City of Providence, the
motion justice granted the City's motion for summary judgment on
the basis that the RUS shielded the City from liability.73 The
Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Flaherty, stated that
given "the unambiguous language of the Recreational Use
Statute" and the "clear and unequivocal" RUS precedent, the
grant of summary judgment must be affirmed in accordance with
"the principle of stare decisis."74 Nevertheless, the Court added in
a footnote: "[w]e reiterate now the difficulty we expressed in Lacey
about a statute that classifies public park visitors as
trespassers for tort law purposes, and we again suggest that the
General Assembly review that statute."75
In the same term as Cruz, the Court was asked to determine
whether the RUS violated the Rhode Island Constitution in
Smiler v. Napolitano.76  One of the plaintiffs, Irina Smiler
("Irina"), was attacked by a swarm of bees while she was walking
near a park bench in a public park owned and operated by the
City of Providence. 77 In attempting to run from the bees, Irina
tripped and fell.78 Irina filed suit against the City of Providence,
alleging negligence, and the motion justice granted the City's
motion for summary judgment on the ground that the RUS
shielded it from liability.79
On appeal, Irina contended that the Recreational Use Statute
was in violation of Article I, section 5 of the Rhode Island
Constitution8O because the RUS shields a landowner from liability
70. Id. at 405-06.
71. Id. at 406.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 407.
75. Id. at 407 n.2.
76. 911 A.2d 1035, 1037 (R.I. 2006).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1037-38.
80. Article I, section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution provides that:
Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by
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in almost all circumstances and the willful or malicious exception
that the RUS contains81 is "overly prohibitive and logically
impossible to invoke."82 Noting at the outset that legislative
enactments are presumed constitutional and that the Court's "role
is to interpret and apply statutes and not to legislate," the Court
unanimously rejected Irina's constitutional challenge to the RUS
stating that the "plaintiffs incorrectly read the statute to mean
that the city's duty would have arisen only after the bees began
attacking Irina."83 The Court explained "[i]t would be absurd to
conclude that the Legislature would require a landowner to sit
idly by and wait until peril arose before a duty to warn the
individual attached" and further explained that, in this case, "the
city's duty would arise at the point when a city employee
discovered that Irina was approaching an area where there was a
known risk of bees."84 Therefore, the Court held that the RUS is
constitutional and affirmed the motion justice's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.8 5 Once more, the Court
expressed its dissatisfaction with the result it was constrained to
reach:
Before concluding, we reiterate our concern with the
troubling results ensuing from the current statutory
scheme. In Lacey, we expressed our concerns about
classifying users of state and municipal-owned
recreational property as trespassers, and we continue to
do so today. We find it particularly difficult to hold the
state or a municipality harmless for injuries occurring on
having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be
received in one's person, property, or character. Every person ought
to obtain right and justice freely, and without purchase, completely
and without denial; promptly and without delay; conformably to the
laws.
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5.
81. Section 32-6-5 of the Rhode Island General Laws provides, in
pertinent part, that "(a) [n]othing in this chapter limits in any way any
liability which, but for this chapter, otherwise exists: (1) [flor the willful or
malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use,
structure, or activity after discovering the user's peril[.]" R.I. GEN. LAWS § 32-
6-5(a)(1) (1994); see supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
82. Smiler, 911 A.2d at 1039.
83. Id. at 1038, 1041.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1041-42.
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public property to which our citizens are invited,
particularly when the state and its municipalities are
presumptively better able to bear the burden of damages
than are most users of recreational facilities. We are
additionally concerned about the protection of this state's
citizens, given that the statutory scheme does nothing to
motivate governmental landowners to make their
properties safe.
For these reasons, and yet again, we urge the legislature
to revisit the Recreational Use Statute so that we are not
again constrained to reach such a troubling result.8 6
The final Rhode Island Supreme Court case interpreting the
RUS prior to Berman v. Sitrin was Labedz v. State,8 7 decided in
2007. In Labedz, while walking along a concrete path at a state-
owned beach, the plaintiff tripped on an uneven surface and fell,
fracturing her wrist.88 In the ensuing negligence action brought
against the State, the hearing justice granted the State's motion
for summary judgment on RUS grounds.8 9 On appeal, the Court
held that, based on the "unambiguous language" of the RUS and
"this Court's clear and unequivocal precedent," the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the State needed to be affirmed.90
For the final time, the Court echoed its familiar plea to the
General Assembly:
We would note that our own point of view vis-A-vis the
governmental immunity aspect of the Recreational Use
Statute has been decidedly unenthusiastic. For example,
in Lacey . . . although we held that the state was entitled
to immunity under the Recreational Use Statute, we
expressed concern about the troubling result that we felt
obliged to reach by virtue of our reading of the
Recreational Use Statute, and we urged the General
Assembly to revisit the provisions of that statute
concerning state and municipal immunity. In each of the
86. Id. at 1042 (internal citations omitted).
87. 919 A.2d 415 (R.I. 2007).
88. Id. at 416.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 417.
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cases that followed Lacey, we reiterated both our concern
about the real-world results that the subject provision of
the Recreational Use Statute required us to reach and our
suggestion that the General Assembly revisit the
provisions of the statute. We take this opportunity once
again to urge the General Assembly to review the
statute.91
C. Is Anybody Listening? The 2009 Proposed Amendment
Although the Court's oft-repeated suggestion that the General
Assembly revisit certain provisions of the RUS has gone unheeded
thus far, the Court's pleas have not entirely fallen on deaf ears.
On March 11, 2009, Rhode Island Representatives Charlene M.
Lima, Edwin R. Pacheco, Kenneth Carter, and Robert B. Jacquard
introduced a bill in the General Assembly that would have
changed the definition of "owner" in the Recreational Use Statute
"to exclude the state and municipalities for the purposes of
liability limitations relating to public use of private lands."9 2 The
bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee 93 where, on
April 28, 2009, it was recommended that the "measure be held for
further study."94 In any event, the amendment was not passed
and, at the time of this writing, the definition of "owner" in the
Recreational Use Statute still includes the state and
municipalities, 95 as it has since the 1996 amendment. Against
this backdrop of legislative inaction and increasing judicial
frustration with the RUS, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
decided the pivotal case of Berman v. Sitrin96 in 2010.
II. THE SEA CHANGE: BERMAN V. SITRIN
A. Background
The Berman case involved undeniably tragic facts. On
91. Id. at 417 (internal citations omitted).
92. H.B. 5971, 2009 Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2009).
93. Id.
94. 2009 H. Numerical B. Status Rep. 5900-6199 (R.I. 2009),
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/bistatus09/h5900-6199.pdf.
95. R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-2(3) (Supp. 2010).
96. 991 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 2010).
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August 17, 2000, newlyweds Simcha and Sarah Berman stopped
in Newport, Rhode Island while on their honeymoon. 97 After
taking a tour of the Breakers, a historic mansion located in the
City, the couple decided to walk along the Cliff Walk, a major
tourist attraction that "runs along 18,000 feet of Newport's
shoreline, high above the rocky Atlantic coast[.]" 9 8 The walk, a
public easement over private land, is owned by numerous
individuals and entities, but the City "has assumed authority and
exercises control over the Cliff Walk, both by regulation and
maintenance."99 While on the Cliff Walk, Simcha and Sarah
noticed what they termed a "'beaten path"' which ostensibly led to
the water100 Simcha left the Cliff Walk and proceeded down this
path when the ground suddenly "gave way" beneath his feet.101
The resulting twenty-nine foot fall to the rocks below left Simcha
with a severe spinal cord injury that rendered him, at just twenty-
three years old, a quadriplegic.102
In 2003, Simcha and Sarah filed suit in Newport County
Superior Court against the City, the State of Rhode Island
("State"), and The Preservation Society of Newport ("Society")
(collectively "the defendants"), alleging that the defendants failed
to "properly inspect, maintain, and repair the Cliff Walk" and
"failed to guard or warn against" known defects of the Cliff
Walk.10 3 The defendants moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the RUS immunized them from liability and the
motion justice granted summary judgment for the City and the
Society. 104 Simcha and Sarah subsequently appealed.10 5
97. Id. at 1042.
98. Id. at 1041-42.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1042.
101. Id.
102. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1042. Sometime after this tragic event, Simcha
and Sarah were divorced. Id. at n.5.
103. Id. at 1042.
104. Id. at 1042-43.
105. Id. at 1043. As the motion justice denied the State's motion for
summary judgment, the State was not party to the appeal. Id. at 1042.
Furthermore, this Note is concerned only with the Court's opinion in this case
as it pertains to the City. As such, the remainder of this discussion will focus
on that part of the Court's opinion only.
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B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice Goldberg, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court vacated the motion justice's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City.106 After setting out the limited
liability provisions of the RUS,107 the Court remarked that "the
Legislature declared that all people who use this state's public
recreational resources are classified as trespassers."'108 The Court
then explained that the crucial provision of the RUS at issue in
this case was the exception that reads "(a) [n]othing in this
chapter limits in any way liability which, but for this chapter,
otherwise exists: (1) [fjor the willful or malicious failure to guard
or to warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or
activity after discovering the user's peril[.]" 109 The Court noted
that this exception essentially provides a two-part test: (1)
whether the landowner "engaged in a willful or malicious failure
to warn or guard against a known danger" (2) "after discovering
the user's peril."110 Acknowledging that the second part of this
test was "the more troublesome phrase,"11 the majority proceeded
to analyze the language of this exception. Before doing so,
however, the Court set forth some of its relevant principles of
statutory interpretation. The Court explained, "when the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must
interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the
statute their plain and ordinary meanings." 1 2  The Court
qualified its statement of the plain meaning rule by adding that
"this Court will not interpret a statute literally when doing so
would lead to an absurd result, or one that is at odds with
legislative intent."113
The City, relying on the Court's established precedent,
contended that the exception at issue would not be triggered
106. Id. at 1041.
107. R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-3 (1994). See supra note 12 and accompanying
text for the language of the liability limiting provisions of the RUS.
108. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1044 & n.7 ("under the RUS as it stands today,
everyone who uses public recreational facilities is classified as a trespasser.").
109. Id. at 1044.
110. Id. at 1049.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1043.
113. Id. at 1049.
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unless a City employee actually saw a person about to approach a
danger and failed to warn that person.114 Conceding that the
City's contention "may be a plausible argument based on our
previous cases," the Court nevertheless held that the City's
"argument must fail in the face of the facts and the
instrumentality at issue in this case." 115 Characterizing the City's
argument as being "based on an overly narrow reading of the
statutory language," the Court concluded that "such a reading
would lead to an absurd and blatantly unjust result."116 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court placed great emphasis on the
fact that the City knew of the dangers posed by the Cliff Walk and
failed to do anything to remedy the problems. Mentioning several
of the facts contained in Justice Goldberg's dissenting opinion in
Cain v. Johnson,"17 the Court explained that the City was aware
of "latent defects in the structure of the Cliff Walk that are not
obvious to the occasional visitor" and nevertheless failed to take
any safety measures "even in the face of several fatal or near fatal
incidents."118  Based on the Cliff Walk's history, the Court
reasoned that "the [C]ity had actual or constructive knowledge of
the perilous circumstances, and, having been afforded a
reasonable amount of time to eliminate the dangerous condition,
failed to do so."119 The majority then concluded that "[t]his failure
places the members of the public whom the [C]ity invites to visit
the Cliff Walk in a position of peril."120
The Berman majority also distinguished the Court's prior
decisions in Smiler v. Napolitanol2 ' and Lacey v. Reitsma12 2 on
114. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1048.
115. Id. at 1048-49.
116. Id. at 1050.
117. 755 A.2d 156, 166-67 (R.I. 2000). Specifically, the Berman majority
recounted the death of the Salve Regina University student who fell from the
Cliff Walk in 1987, the letter-writing efforts of the then-President of Salve
Regina University, and the 1989 National Park Service report, all of which
were included in Justice Goldberg's dissent in Cain. See Berman, 991 A.2d at
1050. For a more detailed discussion of these facts, see supra notes 43-48 and
accompanying text.
118. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1049.
119. Id. at 1050.
120. Id.
121. 911 A.2d 1035, 1042 (R.I. 2006). For a discussion of the Smiler case,
see supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
122. 899 A.2d 455, 458-59 (R.I. 2006). For a discussion of the Lacey case,
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the basis of the number of prior incidents occurring on the Cliff
Walk. The Berman Court contrasted a "single injury in a given
location," presented by the facts of both Smiler and Lacey, with
"evidence that the governmental entity knew of the danger and
then failed to take any action to guard against it, such that
additional tragic injuries continued to occur," presented by the
facts of Berman.123 To drive the point home, the Court noted that
"[i]t is because of the multiple incidents of death and grievous
injury that we conclude that the [C]ity may not successfully
defend this claim based on an assertion that it had no specific
knowledge of Simcha or any peril confronting him."1 2 4 The Court
therefore concluded that, given the throngs of tourists who visit
the Cliff Walk each year:
the [C]ity had an affirmative duty to take reasonable
steps to warn and shield unsuspecting visitors ... against
these known and grave dangers in some reasonable
manner. To construe the RUS otherwise, would not only
lead to an absurd result, but it would also render the
exception nugatory.125
In closing its analysis of the "after discovering the user's peril"
language of the RUS, the Court explained that interpreting this
language to require actual discovery of a particular person "would
serve as a disincentive to the state and its subdivisions to make
necessary safety repairs to publicly owned and taxpayer-financed
recreational facilities, or to warn the unsuspecting and innocent
members of the public of known dangerous conditions."126
Touching briefly on the first part ("willful or malicious failure
to guard or warn against a dangerous condition") of the exception's
two-part test, the Court held that, under the facts of this case, "a
fact-finder reasonably could find that after learning about the Cliff
see supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
123. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1051.
124. Id. Later in the opinion, the Court noted that "[w]e emphasize that it
is the number of serious injuries flowing from a known risk that brings us to
this conclusion today." Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Elsewhere in the Court's opinion, the majority states that "[w]e
are not persuaded that the Legislature intended the RUS to serve as an
invitation to ignore known hazards while profiting from this major tourist
attraction where such danger is present. We simply decline to attribute such
intent to the Legislature." Id. at 1053.
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Walk's instability . . . the [C]ity voluntarily and intentionally
failed to guard against the dangerous condition, knowing that
there existed a strong likelihood that a visitor to the Cliff Walk
would suffer serious injury or death."127 Such a finding, the Court
explained, would support a conclusion that the first part of the
test was satisfied here. 128
C. The Concurring Opinion
Although "completely concur[ring]" in the majority opinion, 129
Justice Flaherty wrote separately to emphasize two points.
Justice Flaherty began by stating that affirming the motion
justice's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on these
facts "would require this Court to embrace a conclusion that the
landowner, saturated with knowledge that some feature of his
land presents a clear and present danger to completely innocent
users, simply could adopt a 'see no evil, hear no evil, speak no
evil,' attitude" and be held immune from liability.130 To conclude
that this is what the General Assembly intended in enacting the
RUS, Justice Flaherty reasoned, "would be beyond absurd."131
Finally, Justice Flaherty noted that such a holding "would provide
an incentive to landowners to be callous and altogether
irresponsible with respect to the safety of people entering upon
their land."13 2
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Differing sharply from the majority, Chief Justice Suttell,
joined by Justice Robinson, dissented and concluded that "general
knowledge that recreational property has some dangerous element
is not enough to give rise to a duty under the statute."133 The
dissent asserted that the majority's analysis "cannot be squared
with the language of the statute or with our settled
jurisprudence."134 Reiterating the "after discovering the user's
127. Id. at 1052.
128. Id. at 1053.
129. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1053-54 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 1054.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1055 (Suttell, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Id. at 1054. The dissent further explained that the majority's analysis
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peril" language of section 32-6-5 of the Rhode Island General
Laws135 is 'simply a legislative codification of the common law"'
trespasser rule, the dissent explained that the well settled duty to
refrain from willful or malicious conduct 'arises only after a
trespasser is discovered in a position of danger."1 36 The dissent
emphasized that knowledge of a dangerous condition and/or
knowledge of the use of property by others is insufficient to trigger
the duty: 'the law does not impose upon a landowner any duty
toward a trespasser unless it has first discovered him or her in a
position of peril, even though there was an allegation that the
[landowner] knew or should have known of the presence of people
on the [land]."1 3 7  Noting the majority in Cain v. Johnson138
rejected the "beaten path" exception to the trespasser rule, 139 the
dissent pointed out 'this Court has steadfastly held that a
landowner owes a trespasser no duty until he or she is actually
discovered in a position of peril."'140 If these principles were
correctly applied, the dissent reasoned, "a duty on the part of the
[C]ity would have arisen only if an employee of the [C]ity had
discovered [Simcha] approaching an area where there was a
known risk of danger and, thereafter, that employee willfully or
maliciously failed to guard or warn him against the danger."141
After explaining how the majority improperly interpreted the
unambiguous language of the RUS and the Court's clear RUS
precedent, 142 the dissent turned to the majority's argument that
the RUS incentivizes a public landowner to not take necessary
safety measures. The dissent candidly agreed with the majority
on this point, explaining that the City's failure to take any action
to improve safety on the Cliff Walk despite numerous incidents of
was "at odds with the unambiguous" and "clear statutory language and clear
precedent." Id. at 1055-56.
135. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 32-6-5(a)(1) (1994).
136. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1054 (Suttell, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156, 160, 164 (R.I.
2000)).
137. Id. at 1055 (quoting Cain, 755 A.2d at 161).
138. 755 A.2d 156 (R.I. 2000).
139. For a discussion of the "beaten path" exception and its rejection by
the Cain majority, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
140. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1055 (Suttell, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (quoting Cain, 755 A.2d at 161).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1055-56.
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injury "is likely because the RUS not only protects the [C]ity from
liability but also acts as a disincentive for the [C]ity to implement
any safety measures whatsoever."14 3  However, the dissent
rejected the notion that strained interpretation of the RUS was
the solution to this problem. Further, the Court has "on several
occasions exhorted the General Assembly to revisit the provisions
of the RUS,"'44 and '[i]t is not for this Court to assume a
legislative function when the General Assembly chooses to remain
silent."" 4 5
The Court, the dissent cautioned, "must decline 'to substitute
[its] will for that of a body democratically elected by the citizens of
this state."' 146  Poignantly, the dissent concluded that "'[t]he
remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation, but in amendment
or repeal."" 4 7 In the final sentence of his dissent, Chief Justice
Suttell concluded by sounding a familiar refrain, "once again
urg[ing] the General Assembly to address the scope of the
[RUS]."148
III. WHAT WENT WRONG?
It is clear that the majority's opinion was influenced by the
tragic facts with which the Court was presented and its desire to
allow the plaintiffs' claims to go forward is almost laudable.
Nevertheless, the majority opinion in Berman is fundamentally
flawed for three reasons. First, the majority, in ignoring the
legislative intent behind the RUS, failed to faithfully follow the
very standard for statutory interpretation that it enunciated.
More importantly, the majority's interpretation of the RUS cannot
be reconciled with either the clear and unambiguous language of
the statute or the Court's established precedent. Finally, and of
143. Id. at 1055.
144. Id. at 1055.
145. Id. at 1056 (quoting DeSantis v. Prelle, 891 A.2d 873, 881 (R.I. 2006)).
146. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1056 (quoting DeSantis, 891 A.2d at 881).
147. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Duggan, 6 A. 787, 788
(R.I. 1886)). In a footnote, the dissent added "[tihis Court is not 'entitled to
write into the statute certain provisions of policy which the [L]egislature
might have provided but has seen fit to omit ... if a change in that respect is
desirable, it is for the [L]egislature and not for the [C]ourt."' Id. at 1056 n.17
(alterations in original) (quoting Simeone v. Charron, 762 A.2d 442, 448 (R.I.
2000)) (internal quotations and ellipses omitted).
148. Id. at 1056.
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utmost importance to our system of state governance, by
erroneously construing the statute to reach the result that it
wanted, the majority failed to perform its judicial role and
improperly assumed a legislative function.149 While the dissent
mentioned some of these flaws, its treatment of them was rather
superficial and conciliatory. Therefore, the remainder of Part III
seeks to further develop the problems with the majority's
reasoning.
A. The Majority Failed to Properly Follow Its Own Standard
The majority in Berman critically erred by failing to let the
legislative intent behind the RUS guide its analysis and
interpretation of the "after discovering the user's peril" language.
After stating the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation,
the Berman majority added that "this Court will not interpret a
statute literally when doing so would lead to an absurd result, or
one that is at odds with legislative intent."150 Additionally, the
Court noted that its "obligation is to ascertain the legislative
intent behind the enactment and give effect to that intent."151
However, apart from mentioning at the very beginning of its
analysis that the General Assembly's intent in enacting the RUS
"was 'to treat those who use private property for recreational
purposes as though they were trespassers," 52 the majority
eschewed any further discussion of legislative intent and focused
all of its efforts on avoiding what it perceived as an absurd
result.153
149. See DeSantis, 891 A.2d at 881 (discussing how a court should refrain
from undertaking a legislative function when the General Assembly remains
silent); see also Part III.C, infra notes 191-207 and accompanying text.
150. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1049 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 1043.
152. Id. (quoting Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056,
1060 (R.I. 1994)).
153. See id. at 1049 ("applying the term ['after discovering the user's
peril'] literally is unreasonable"); id. at 1050 (City's argument that "after
discovering the user's peril" language requires actual discovery of a
particular user before duty arises was rejected because "such a reading [of
the RUS] would lead to an absurd and blatantly unjust result.") (emphasis
added); id. at 1051 ("[t]o construe the RUS otherwise would not only lead to
an absurd result, but it would also render the exception nugatory.")
(emphasis added); id. at 1053 (City's interpretation of RUS "is not only
absurd, but unjust.") (emphasis added).
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Indeed, when the majority did mention the intent of the
legislature elsewhere in its opinion, it was merely to bolster its
conclusion that interpreting the RUS to immunize the City on
these facts would be absurd. For example, after explaining that
an interpretation of the RUS contrary to its interpretation would
be "absurd" and "unjust," the Court declared "[wle are not
persuaded that the Legislature intended the RUS to serve as an
invitation to ignore known hazards while profiting from this major
tourist attraction where such danger is present. We simply
decline to attribute such intent to the Legislature."' 54 This self-
serving formulation of legislative intent - "the Legislature must
not have intended this" - fails to fulfill the Court's stated
obligation to "ascertain the legislative intent behind the
enactment"1 55 of a statute. The majority critically erred by
focusing on what it perceived to be an absurd result (and on what
the Legislature did not intend) instead of focusing on what exactly
the Legislature intended in enacting the RUS and letting this
intention guide its analysis. 156 Justice Flaherty, for his part,
committed the same error in his concurring opinion.157
154. Id. at 1053. In a similar vein, the Court explained, "we cannot
conclude that when the Legislature extended the protection of the RUS to the
states and municipalities, it intended to relieve the [Clity from any
responsibility whatsoever to the many tourists who visit the Cliff Walk." Id.
at 1051.
155. Id. at 1043 (emphasis added).
156. In the majority's defense, the standard it was purporting to apply is
disjunctive in nature: "this Court will not interpret a statute literally when
doing so would lead to an absurd result, or one that is at odds with legislative
intent." Berman, 991 A.2d at 1049 (emphasis added). Based on this
disjunctive nature, one may argue that the majority did not err in applying
this standard because it at least focused on one of the prongs (the absurd
result prong). However, this argument overlooks the Court's stated
obligation in interpreting all statutes: "to ascertain the legislative intent
behind the enactment and to give effect to that intent." Id. at 1043.
Therefore, even if focusing solely on avoiding a perceived unjust result is
considered to be a permissible application of its articulated standard, the
Court's unwillingness to give effect to the General Assembly's intent behind
the enactment of the RUS cannot be squared with its stated obligation.
Thus, the Court's refusal to let the legislative intent behind the RUS (to treat
those who use land for recreational use as trespassers under the Court's
established trespasser jurisprudence) guide its analysis was a critical error.
157. See id. at 1054. After discussing the "see no evil, hear no evil, speak
no evil attitude" that would be adopted if the RUS immunized the City on
these facts, Justice Flaherty remarked, '"I cannot begin to conceive that the
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The Court's error in applying its stated standard directly led
it to its incorrect conclusion. By interpreting the statute with
such a singular purpose - viz., to avoid an absurd result - the
majority opinion paid lip service to the legislative intent behind
the enactment of the RUS. Prior to Berman, the Court has
repeatedly maintained that "the obvious intention of the
Legislature [in enacting the RUS] was to treat those who use
private property for recreational purposes as though they were
trespassers."' 5 8 As it is "obvious" that the Legislature intended to
treat those who use the land of others for recreational purposes as
trespassers, it follows that interpretation of and analysis under
the RUS must mirror the common law's trespasser rule analysis.
Indeed, the Court has previously held in Cain v. Johnson159 that
the RUS "is simply a legislative codification of the common law
[trespasser rule] that is enunciated in our cases." 160 However, as
discussed below, the majority failed to conduct its analysis in a
manner consistent with the Court's trespasser precedent, both
under the common law and under the RUS. Had the majority
allowed the intention of the General Assembly to guide its
analysis, the Court would not have made the critical error of
equating discovery of a condition with discovery of a particular
trespasser.161 Instead, by focusing solely on avoiding an absurd
result, the majority reached a decision squarely at odds with the
legislative intent behind the RUS.
B. The Majority Failed to Follow the Plain Language of the RUS
and the Court's Established Precedent
Even more problematic than its failure to faithfully follow its
articulated standard, the Berman majority's interpretation of the
General Assembly had any such intent; to conclude otherwise would be
beyond absurd." Id.
158. Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056, 1060 (R.I.
1994) (emphasis added); see Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 713 (R.I. 2003);
Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156, 173 (R.I. 2000) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Note that Tantimonico predated the 1996 amendment to the RUS, which
included the state and municipalities in the definition of "owner." See 1996
R.I. Pub. Laws 1229. This may explain why "private" modifies "property" in
the language quoted in the text above. See Tantimonico, 637 A.2d at 1060.
159. 755 A.2d 156 (R.I. 2000).
160. Id. at 164.
161. See Part III.B, infra notes 162-90 and accompanying text.
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RUS cannot be reconciled with either the unambiguous language
of the RUS or the Court's established precedent. In Berman, the
Court attempted to justify its conclusion that the City could not
claim immunity under the RUS by emphasizing that the City had
extensive knowledge of the dangers posed by the Cliff Walk. After
discussing in detail the evidence of the 'latent defects" of the Cliff
Walk and concluding that the City had "actual or constructive
knowledge" of the dangers yet failed to take any action, the Court
"emphasize[d] that it is the number of serious injuries flowing
from a known risk that brings us to this conclusion today." 162
Moreover, the majority distinguished this case from Smiler v.
Napolitano163 and Lacey v. Reitsma16 4 by pointing out that the
Court in those cases was presented with no evidence that of the
landowner's prior knowledge of the dangerous condition.165
Specifically, the Berman majority honed in on particular language
of the Smiler opinion and characterized the holding of Smiler in a
unique way to give its own conclusion more support:
In Smiler . . . we declared that "[i]t would be absurd to
conclude that the Legislature would require a landowner
to sit idly by and wait until peril arose before a duty to
warn the individual attached."... We held that the RUS
was a bar to liability because Providence did not know of
the presence of the bees and thus had not yet discovered
the plaintiffs peril.166
Finally, and quite remarkably, the Berman majority maintained
that the City's knowledge of the dangerous condition and its
corresponding failure to take any action to rectify the problem
"place[d] the members of the public whom the [C]ity invites to
visit the Cliff Walk in a position of peril."16 7
162. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1049-51. Elsewhere in the opinion the Court
again added, "[i]t is because of the multiple incidents of death and grievous
injury that we conclude that the [C]ity may not successfully defend this claim
based on an assertion that it had no specific knowledge of Simcha or any peril
confronting him." Id. at 1051.
163. 911 A.2d 1035 (R.I. 2006). For a discussion of the Smiler case, see
supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
164. 899 A.2d 455 (R.I. 2006). For a discussion of the Lacey case, see supra
notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
165. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1051.
166. Id. (quoting Smiler, 911 A.2d at 1037-38, 1041).
167. Id. at 1050 (emphasis added).
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The majority was surely wrong on this score. Prior to its
decision in Berman, the Court has made it abundantly clear that
actual discovery of a particular trespasser in a position of peril is
the prerequisite necessary to trigger the duty to refrain from
willful or malicious conduct; mere knowledge or discovery of a
danger, without discovery of a particular trespasser about to
encounter that danger, is insufficient to trigger this duty. 168 Until
Berman, interpretation of and analysis under the RUS has
proceeded in a manner consistent with this well-established rule.
The Court has repeatedly declared hat the language of the RUS is
clear and "unambiguous"169 and has referred to its relevant
precedent as "clear and unequivocal."170 The RUS does not
suggest that knowledge of a dangerous condition, without
discovery of the user of the land, has any relevance whatsoever in
the RUS inquiry.171 Additionally, from its decision in Cain until
its decision in Berman, the Court has consistently affirmed grants
of summary judgment in favor of municipal landowners because
the plaintiff in each case was unable to adduce evidence that the
landowner actually discovered the plaintiff in a position of
peril.172
168. See id. at 1054-55 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting); Smiler, 911 A.2d at
1039, 1041; Lacey, 899 A.2d at 458; Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 713 (R.I.
2003); Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156, 160, 161, 162, 164 (R.I. 2000); Wolf v.
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 697 A.2d 1082, 1086 (R.I. 1997); Zoubra v. N.Y.,
New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 150 A.2d 643, 644-45 (R.I. 1959); Boday v.
N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 165 A. 448, 448-49 (R.I. 1933).
169. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1055 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting); Labedz v. State,
919 A.2d 415, 417 (R.I. 2007); Cruz v. City of Providence, 908 A.2d 405, 407
(R.I. 2006); Lacey, 899 A.2d at 457-58; Hanley, 837 A.2d at 712; see Smiler,
911 A.2d at 1041 ("we do not believe the statute is ambiguous").
170. Labedz, 919 A.2d at 417; Cruz, 908 A.2d at 407; see Berman, 991 A.2d
at 1055 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the Court's RUS precedent as
"settled"); Lacey, 899 A.2d at 458 (referring to "unambiguous nature of the
relevant precedent").
171. If anything, the RUS seems to suggest just the opposite: "an owner of
land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any
person to use that property for recreational purposes does not thereby: (1)
[e]xtend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose." R.I. GEN.
LAws § 32-6-3 (1994) (emphasis added).
172. See Smiler, 911 A.2d at 1041 ("[iut is clear to this Court that the city's
duty would arise at the point when a city employee discovered that Irina was
approaching an area where there was a known risk of bees") (emphasis
added); Lacey, 899 A.2d at 458 (affirming the grant of summary judgment
because plaintiffs "pointed to no evidence that these defendants discovered
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In each of these preceding cases, the Court placed no
emphasis on any knowledge of a dangerous condition that the
landowner may have had. Indeed, the majority in Cain expressly
declined to do so despite ample evidence suggesting that the City
had extensive knowledge of the dangers posed by the Cliff
Walk.173 In sum, under both the RUS and the common law,
actual discovery of a trespasser is required to trigger the duty and,
as the dissent in Berman aptly stated, "general knowledge that
recreational property has some dangerous element is not enough
to give rise to a duty under the statute."174
Viewed in light of this background, the Berman majority's
effort to distinguish Smiler v. Napolitano175 and Lacey v.
Reitsma176 is wholly unconvincing. The majority emphasized that
"[iun both of the aforementioned cases [Smiler and Lacey], there
was no evidence that the governmental entity knew of the danger
and then failed to take any action to guard against it, such that
additional tragic injuries continued to occur."177 Vhile this may
be true, Cain and its progeny make clear it is the actual discovery
of the particular person in a position of peril - and not the
knowledge or discovery of a dangerous condition on the property -
that triggers the duty to refrain from willful or malicious
conduct. 178
young R.J. in a position of peril and then failed to warn him against the
potentially dangerous condition.") (emphasis added); Hanley, 837 A.2d at 713
(affirming the grant of summary judgment because plaintiffs did not
"demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact that, 'after discovering the
user's peril[,]' the state willfully or maliciously failed to 'guard or warn
against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity[.]"') (alterations in
original); Cain, 755 A.2d at 164 ("[a]bsolutely no evidence has been presented
to suggest that the defendants or any of them were aware of the decedent's
position of peril.").
173. Cain, 755 A.2d at 160-61 (rejecting the "beaten path exception" and
stating that "this Court has steadfastly held that a landowner owes a
trespasser no duty until he or she is actually discovered in a position of
peril.") (emphasis added). See Berman, 991 A.2d at 1055 (Suttell, C.J.
dissenting) (quoting this passage from Cain).
174. 991 A.2d at 1055.
175. 911 A.2d 1035 (R.I. 2006). For a discussion of the Smiler case, see
supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
176. 899 A.2d 455 (R.I. 2006). For a discussion of the Lacey case, see supra
notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
177. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1051.
178. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
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In fact, the Court maintained in both Smiler and Lacey it was
affirming the grants of summary judgment in favor of the
municipal landowners because there was no evidence that each
particular plaintiff had actually been discovered in a position of
peril. 179 Therefore, the majority's characterization of the Smiler
holding - "[w]e held that the RUS was a bar to liability because
Providence did not know of the presence of the bees and thus had
not yet discovered the plaintiffs peril"'180 - was most certainly
incorrect. While knowledge or discovery of a dangerous condition
may be a necessary component of discovering a particular person
in a position of peril, it is meaningless unless coupled with the
other necessary component - actual discovery of a particular
person about to encounter that known/discovered danger.
The Berman Court's error was magnified by its conclusion
that the City's failure to eliminate the dangerous condition
"place[d] the members of the public whom the [C]ity invites to
visit the Cliff Walk in a position of peril."' 8 This statement is
glaringly inconsistent with the language of the RUS and the
Court's precedent. Section 32-6-5 of the Rhode Island General
Laws provides, in pertinent part, that the RUS does not relieve a
landowner's liability "[flor the willful or malicious failure to guard
or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity
after discovering the user's peril[.]"182 As interpreted by the Court
on numerous occasions and as mentioned in Part I of this Note,18 3
the phrase "after discovering the user's peril" "is simply a
legislative codification of the common law [trespasser rule] as
enunciated in [the Court's] cases."18 4  This trespasser rule
requires actual discovery of a particular person in a position of
peril. Equating actual discovery of a particular person in a
179. See Smiler, 911 A.2d at 1041 ("[i]t is clear to this Court that the city's
duty would arise at the point when a city employee discovered that Irina was
approaching an area where there was a known risk of bees.") (emphasis
added); Lacey, 899 A.2d at 458 (affirming the grant of summary judgment
because plaintiffs "pointed to no evidence that these defendants discovered
young R.J. in a position of peril and then failed to warn him against the
potentially dangerous condition.") (emphases added).
180. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1051.
181. Id. at 1050 (emphasis added).
182. R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-5(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
183. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
184. Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156, 164 (R.I. 2000).
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position of peril with a failure to remedy known dangers which
places members of the public (both present and future) in a
position of peril finds no support in Rhode Island law.18 5
Finally, the Berman majority erred by relying on two cases
interpreting recreational use statutes of other states to bolster its
conclusion that knowledge of a dangerous condition, coupled with
the failure to take any remedial action with respect of that
condition, may be sufficient evidence of a willful or malicious
failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition.' 8 6 The
Court cited to passages from decisions of the Georgia Court of
Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit which indicated that such a combination of knowledge and
inaction would likely constitute willful or malicious conduct under
the recreational use statutes being interpreted. 8 7 However, the
recreational use statutes interpreted in those cases - Georgia's
Recreational Property Act' 88 and the Illinois Recreational Use of
Land and Water Areas Act,189 respectively - do not contain the
critical "after discovering the user's peril" language that the
Rhode Island RUS contains. 190
185. It is also important to note that the phrase at issue in Berman was
"after discovering the user's peril" and not "after discovering a user's peril."
The former, more constrained formulation of this phrase supports the
conclusion that the duty to refrain from willful or malicious conduct, once it
arises, is owed to a particular user and not a class of users.
186. See Berman, 991 A.2d at 1052-53.
187. Id. at 1052 (citing Quick v. Stone Mountain Mem'l Assoc., 420 S.E.2d
36, 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)); id. at 1052-53 (citing Cacia v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., 290 F.3d 914, 915, 917, 920 (7th Cir. 2002)).
188. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (2000).
189. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/1 to 65/7 (LexisNexis 2008).
190. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 32-6-5(a)(1) (1994) (containing "after discovering
the user's peril" language); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-25 (2000) (not containing
such language); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.65/6 (LexisNexis 2008) (not
containing such language). In fact, the "after discovering the user's peril
language" contained in the Rhode Island RUS is rather unique; of the fifty
states that have recreational use statutes, only Rhode Island's statute
contains such language. For other recreational use statutes not containing
this language, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557h (West 2005); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A(4) (2003 & Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 21, § 17C(a) (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (LexisNexis
2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42A-4 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42A-7
(West 2010); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103(2) (McKinney 2010); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 5793(a) (2002). For the complete list of recreational use
statutes of the 50 states, see Elizabeth R. Springsteen & Rusty W. Rumley,
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Although the Berman majority may have correctly decided the
City's conduct would amount to a willful or malicious failure to
guard or warn against a dangerous condition, this inquiry should
never have been undertaken because the prerequisite necessary to
trigger the duty to refrain from such conduct - viz., the actual
discovering of a particular person in a position of peril - was not
satisfied. Therefore, the Court improperly cited to cases from
other jurisdictions with significantly different recreational use
statutes in an effort to bolster its conclusion that the Rhode Island
RUS should not be applied to immunize the City from liability on
the facts of this case.
Thus, the Court's failure to follow its own well-established
precedent and to apply the plain and unambiguous language of
the RUS led the Court to a conclusion which, although admirable
for its attempt to right a serious wrong, cannot be squared with
the prior RUS framework.
C. The Majority Failed to Properly Perform Its Judicial Role
Finally, the most problematic flaw in Berman, and one that
undermines Rhode Island's system of state governance, is the
majority's willingness to overstep the bounds of its proper judicial
role and to assume a legislative function. The Rhode Island
Constitution explicitly provides for the principle of separation of
powers in Article V, which states that "[t]he powers of the
government shall be distributed into three separate and distinct
departments: the legislative, executive and judicial."191  To
effectuate this separation, the Constitution further provides, in
pertinent part, "[t]he legislative power, under this Constitution,
shall be vested in two houses, the one to be called the senate, the
other the house of representatives; and both together the general
assembly[,]"19 2 and "[tihe judicial power of this state shall be
States' Recreational Use Statutes, NAT'L AGRIC. LAW CTR.,
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/recreationaluse/index.html. The
District of Columbia does not have a recreational use statute. See Tom Baker
& Hania Masud, Summary of Legal Rules Governing Liability for
Recreational Use of School Facilities, PUB. HEALTH LAW & POLIcY, April 2010,
http://www.lombardilaw.com/library/Liability_RecreationalUse_Facilities_C
HARTFINAL_ 20100416.pdf.
191. R.I. CONST. art. V.
192. Id. art. VI, § 2.
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vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the
general assembly may, from time to time, ordain and
establish."193 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has consistently
recognized the importance of this constitutional separation of
powers. In DeSantis v. Prelle,194 for example, the Court
unanimously stated:
It is not for this Court to assume a legislative function
when the General Assembly chooses to remain silent...
("[T]he function of adjusting remedies to rights is a
legislative responsibility rather than a judicial task * *
*.") To do otherwise, even if based on sound policy and
the best of intentions, would be to substitute our will for
that of a body democratically elected by the citizens of
this state and to overplay our proper role in the theater of
Rhode Island government. 195
Along the same lines, in Simeone v. Charron196 a unanimous
Court explained "[t]his Court, however, is not 'entitled to write
into [a] statute certain provisions of policy which the legislature
might have provided but has seen fit to omit . . . If a change in
that respect is desirable, it is for the legislature and not for the
court."19 7 Likewise, the Court in Lacey v. Reitsmal9 8 noted, "[w]e
are cognizant of the fact that our judicial role is to interpret and
apply statutes and not to legislate[.]" 199
The need for proper separation of powers is particularly acute
where, as here in the RUS context, there is tension between the
branches of government. The Court has made no secret of its
dislike of the RUS; in fact, on numerous occasions, the Court has
exhorted the General Assembly to reconsider the wisdom of
extending the RUS's protection to state and municipal
193. Id. art. X, § 1.
194. 891 A.2d 873 (R.I. 2006).
195. Id. at 881 (internal citations omitted). See Berman v. Sitrin, 991
A.2d at 1056 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting).
196. 762 A.2d 442 (R.I. 2000).
197. Id. at 448 (quoting Elder v. Elder, 120 A.2d 815, 820 (R.I. 1956)); see
Berman, 991 A.2d at 1056 n.17 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting) (quoting this
language).
198. 899 A.2d 455 (R.I. 2006).
199. Id. at 458; see Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035, 1038 (R.I. 2006)
(quoting this language from Lacey).
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landowners. 200  Despite these numerous pleas, the General
Assembly made no change to the RUS. Frustrated with the
General Assembly's failure to act, perhaps justifiably so, the
Berman majority took matters into its own hands. While the
Court's frustration may have been justified, its action was not. As
the Court stated in Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co.201 with
respect to the RUS, "lt]he Legislature appears to have made a
judgment that the social benefits of resurrecting the common-law
classification [of trespasser] at least for this purpose outweighed
the costs to recreational users."2 02 Even if seemingly unwise, this
policy judgment, once made by a democratically elected
Legislature, may not be cast aside by the Court, regardless of how
strongly the Justices may disagree with the General Assembly's
judgment.203 However, the Berman majority, by interpreting the
RUS in a manner irreconcilable with the plain and unambiguous
language of the RUS and the Court's well-established RUS
precedent, assumed a legislative function by writing another
exception into the RUS. After the Court's opinion, section 32-6-5
of the Rhode Island General Laws 204 essentially needs to be read
as follows:
[n]othing in this chapter limits in any way liability which,
but for this chapter,
otherwise exists:
(1) [fl]or the willful or malicious failure to guard or warn
against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity
after discovering the user's peril or after discovering the
dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.20 5
200. Labedz v. State, 919 A.2d 415, 417 (R.I. 2007); Smiler, 911 A.2d at
1042; Cruz v. City of Providence, 908 A.2d 405, 407 n.2 (R.I. 2006); Lacey, 899
A.2d at 458. For a discussion of these specific exhortations, see supra Part
II.B.
201. 637 A.2d 1056 (R.I. 1994).
202. Id. at 1060-61; see Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156, 173 (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting in part) (quoting this language).
203. See DeSantis v. Prelle, 891 A.2d 873, 881 (R.I. 2006); Simeone v.
Charron, 762 A.2d 442, 448 (R.I. 2000).
204. R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-5(a)(1) (1994).
205. R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-5(a)(1) (1994) (italicized phrase is the author's
own). It should be noted that the phrase "after discovering the user's peril,"
as used in the RUS, could conceivably be read to refer to the dangerous
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Regrettably, in interpreting the RUS in this way, the Court failed
to heed its own wise proviso that its "judicial role is to interpret
and apply statutes and not to legislate[.]"2 06 As Chief Justice
Suttell aptly stated in his dissent in Berman, '[t]he remedy for a
harsh law is not in interpretation, but in amendment or
repeal."' 20 7
IV. THE AFTERMATH
Although it is difficult to accurately predict the fallout from
the Court's decision in Berman, three potential scenarios seem
possible. All three scenarios contravene the legislative intent
behind the RUS, at least to some degree. First, state and
municipal landowners may improve safety by remedying any
perceived dangerous conditions at no cost to land entrants.
Second, governmental landowners may charge the public a fee for
access to the land in order to offset the costs of remedying any
dangerous conditions. Finally, and most troubling, state and
municipal landowners may simply bar public access to lands that
were once held open for recreational use in order to shield
themselves from liability. Even if any of these repercussions
would have some social benefits, because each represents such a
significant change from prior landowner liability law in Rhode
Island, it is the General Assembly and not the Court that should
make any such policy decision.
A. Improve Safety at No Charge
State and municipal landowners may respond to Berman by
doing exactly what the Berman majority wants them to do -
remedy a dangerous condition on the land once knowledge of that
condition ("user's peri") rather than a particular person. However, as far as
the author knows, this argument has never been made. This is probably
because the Court decided that this phrase tracks the Court's own common
law terminology for the trespasser rule. See Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156,
164 (R.I. 2000); Tantimonico, 637 A.2d at 1060-61. Because of this early
interpretation, one must construe the phrase as referring to discovery of a
person and not discovery of a dangerous condition. See supra notes 15-22 and
accompanying text and notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
206. Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455, 458 (R.I. 2006) (emphasis added); see
Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035, 1038 (R.I. 2006) (quoting this language).
207. Berman v. Sitrin, 991 A.2d 1038, 1056 (R.I. 2010) (quoting State v.
Duggan, 6 A. 787, 788 (R.I. 1886)) (alteration in original).
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condition is acquired, while still making the land free and
available to the public for recreational purposes.2 08  These
remedial measures could take several different forms, depending
on the nature of the dangerous condition at issue and of the
property on which the dangerous condition is situated. Taking the
Cliff Walk as a familiar example, the City could have posted
warning signs admonishing those on the Cliff Walk to not venture
off the paved walk 209 or erected a fence or wall along the Cliff
Walk barring access to points off of the Cliff Walk that were
susceptible to erosion. 2 10
In other instances, it may be possible for the landowner to
remedy the dangerous condition himself. At first glance, this does
not seem like a negative repercussion of Berman; indeed, one may
think state and municipal landowners should take it upon
themselves to ensure that property used by the public remains
safe. However, as a matter of economic reality, it is more likely
that governmental landowners will charge some type of fee to the
public to offset the cost of any safety improvements. Additionally,
the duty of a landowner to keep his premises safe for use by others
208. See id. at 1050 ("[Tlhe evidence produced in this case demonstrates
that the [C]ity had actual or constructive knowledge of the perilous
circumstances, and, having been afforded a reasonable amount of time to
eliminate the dangerous condition, failed to do so. This failure places the
members of the public whom the [Clity invites to visit the Cliff Walk in a
position of peril."); id. at 1051 ("[T]he governmental entity knew of the danger
and then failed to take any action to guard against it, such that additional
tragic injuries continued to occur."); see also Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156,
167 (R.I. 2000) (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part) (after reviewing the same
evidence that would later be presented in the Berman opinion, Justice
Goldberg lamented, "[Tihese defendants [including the City] had actual
knowledge of the potential for loss of life posed by this particular area of the
Cliff Walk and did nothing to forestall this calamity.").
209. See Berman, 991 A.2d at 1042 ('The plaintiffs allege that there were
no signs warning of the Cliff Walk's potential hazards at either The Breakers
or the Shepard Avenue entrance" where Simcha and Sarah entered the Cliff
Walk.).
210. See Cain, 755 A.2d at 168 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part) ("Perhaps
the saddest part of this tragedy that resulted in the death of this young man
is that following Cain's death, then-Governor Bruce Sundlun ordered
immediate action and initiated the installation of a fence for the area. We
have been informed that the cost of this repair was $11,960. The meager cost
of this repair of this preventative measure is a shocking circumstance that in
my opinion justifies a trial in this case on the issue of reckless indifference to
the safety of Michael Cain.").
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for recreational purposes was clearly not intended by the RUS. If
such a duty is to be imposed, it should be imposed by the General
Assembly through amendment or repeal of the RUS.
From a purely economic standpoint, it seems unlikely that
state and municipal landowners will remedy dangerous conditions
without attempting to offset the costs of whatever remedial
measures are undertaken. Perhaps one of the main reasons
governmental landowners hold certain lands open to the public at
no charge is the promise of limited liability under the RUS
regime. 2 1 1 If such landowners are now faced with the threat of
liability for dangerous conditions on the land, that incentive for
holding land open to the public for recreational purposes is
substantially diminished, if not completely vitiated.
Furthermore, imposing a duty on the state and municipalities
to remedy dangerous conditions on land made available to the
public for recreational purposes is surely contrary to the
legislative intent behind the RUS. The stated purpose of the RUS
"is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas
available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their
liability to persons entering thereon for those purposes."2 12 Far
from imposing on a landowner a duty to make land safe for
entrants using it for recreational purposes, the RUS provides that
''an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or
permits without charge any person to use that property for
recreational purposes does not thereby: (1) [e]xtend any assurance
that the premises are safe for any purpose[.] 2 13 Moreover, the
RUS goes on to add that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be
211. See Sandra M. Renwand, Note, Beyond Commonwealth v. Auresto:
Which Property is Protected by the Recreation Use of Land & Water Act?, 49
U. PITT. L. REV. 261, 275-76 (1987); Sean D. White, Note, Governmental
Liability for Recreational Uses of Land: Bronsen v. Dawes County, 87 NEB. L.
REV. 569, 582-85 (2008) (suggesting that public landowners need some
motivation to hold their land open to the public and that the limitation of
liability provided by recreational use statutes is an effective motivation for
this purpose). Also, the Rhode Island General Assembly certainly thought
that limiting liability of landowners would be an inducement to hold one's
land open. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-1 (1994) ("The purpose of this chapter is
to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the
public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability to persons entering
thereon for those purposes.") (emphasis added).
212. Id. § 32-6-1 (emphasis added).
213. Id. § 32-6-3 (emphasis added).
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construed to: (1) [c]reate a duty of care or ground of liability for an
injury to persons or property[.]" 2 14
Forcing landowners to choose whether to remedy known
dangerous conditions on their land or face liability for failure to do
so in the event that recreational users are injured thereon is
tantamount to imposing a duty on landowners to make their lands
safe for recreational users - a duty clearly not imposed by the
RUS. While one may question the wisdom of the General
Assembly's policy judgment - as the Court itself has done on
numerous occasions 215 - that policy judgment, once made, must be
revisited solely by the General Assembly or not at all. 216
B. Improve Safety and Offset Costs With Fee for Access
If state and municipal landowners do decide to remedy any
dangerous conditions that exist on their properties, it seems more
likely that the landowners will charge a fee for access rather than
gratuitously undertaking safety efforts at no charge. Charging a
fee for access would help to offset the costs of any of the measures
taken, even if those costs are relatively small. In addition,
charging a fee for public access could also serve as a means of
offsetting any potential litigation costs from the increased
litigation that is likely to arise under the post-Berman RUS
regime. If governmental landowners were to charge a fee, it would
be problematic for two reasons.
First, if this scenario were to transpire, an even larger burden
214. Id. § 32-6-6.
215. See Labedz v. State, 919 A.2d 415, 417 (R.I. 2007); Smiler v.
Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035, 1042 (R.I. 2006); Cruz v. City of Providence, 908
A.2d 405, 407 n.2 (R.I. 2006); Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455, 458 (R.I. 2006).
216. See Berman v. Sitrin, 991 A.2d 1038, 1056 & n. 17 (R.I. 2010)
(Suttell, C.J., dissenting); DeSantis v. Prelle, 891 A.2d 873, 881 (R.I. 2006)
("It is not for this Court to assume a legislative function when the General
Assembly chooses to remain silent . . . To do otherwise, even if based on
sound policy and the best of intentions, would be to substitute our will for
that of a body democratically elected by the citizens of this state and to
overplay our proper role in the theater of Rhode Island government.!)
(internal citations and parenthetical phrases omitted); Simeone v. Charron,
762 A.2d 442, 448 (R.I. 2000) ('This Court, however, is not 'entitled to write
into the statute certain provisions of policy which the legislature might have
provided but has seen fit to omit * * * * * * If a change in that respect is
desirable, it is for the legislature and not for the Court."') (quoting Elder v.
Elder, 120 A.2d 815, 820 (R.I. 1956)).
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would be placed on the state's judicial system. If a landowner
were to charge a fee for public access to land, the RUS provisions
would not apply. 2 17 In such a case, the fee-paying entrant would
no longer be classified as a trespasser and, under Rhode Island
law, the landowner would owe the entrant a duty of reasonable
care under the circumstances. 2 18 As a result, many cases would
withstand summary judgment challenges because the
determination of what constitutes reasonable care under the
circumstances is highly fact-specific. These same cases would
likely not have withstood summary judgment under the pre-
Berman RUS regime because a landowner owed the land entrant
no duty unless that land entrant was first discovered in a position
of peril.2 19 Second, charging fees for access to land would be
contrary to the legislative intent behind the RUS. By charging the
public a fee for entrance, landowners would arguably be making
their land less "available" to recreational users, thereby
frustrating the primary purpose of the RUS.220 Also, if the fee is
charged in an effort to offset the costs of increased litigation, the
entrance fee could be quite high. Since a fee charging landowner
does not have the benefit of the protections provided by the RUS,
it seems unlikely that a purely nominal fee will offset liability
costs under a reasonable care standard. Therefore, if fees are
charged, they will be rather high and this will in turn make land
even less free and "available" to the public, further frustrating the
primary purpose behind the RUS.
217. R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-5(a)(2) (1994) ("(a) Nothing in this chapter
limits in any way any liability which, but for this chapter, otherwise exists:..
. (2) [flor any injury suffered in any case where the owner of land charges the
person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use
thereof[.]") (emphasis added).
218. See Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Ass'n, 713 A.2d 766, 772 n.6 (R.I.
1998); Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1055 & nn.7 & 8 (R.I. 1998); Labrie
v. Pace Membership Warehouse, 678 A.2d 867, 868-69 & n.1 (R.I. 1996).
219. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-5(a)(1) (1994); Smiler v. Napolitano, 911
A.2d 1035, 1041 (R.I. 2006); Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455, 458 & n. 5 (R.I.
2006); Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 713 (R.I. 2003); Cain v. Johnson, 755
A.2d 156, 161-62, 164 (R.I. 2000).
220. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-1 (1994) ('The purpose of this chapter is to
encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the
public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability to persons entering
thereon for those purposes[.]") (emphasis added).
342 ROGER WILLIMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 16:305
C. Barring Access
The third possible implication of the Berman decision - state
and municipal landowners simply barring public access to land
that would have been held open for recreational use under the pre-
Berman regime - represents the most certain liability-limiting
strategy. The RUS would not apply in a situation where a
landowner bars access to his or her land (e.g. by posting "no
trespassing" signs). 221 At the same time, while this scenario
would be the safest of the three for the landowner seeking to limit
his liability, this repercussion most frustrates the purpose of the
RUS. Certainly, it seems highly unlikely that Newport would bar
access to the Cliff Walk, a renowned tourist attraction that brings
countless visitors (and their money) to the City each year, simply
because of fear of increased liability. Not all land covered by the
RUS is of such value to its owners, however. Would a municipal
owner of a small pond or hiking trail (which provides no economic
benefit to the owner) have the same incentive to continue to allow
members of the public to use the premises in the face of liability?
For the vast majority of land covered by the RUS, the benefit of
holding the property open to the public will not be worth the risk
of increased liability. Far from encouraging landowners to make
their land available to the public,222 if this implication
materializes, Berman can correctly be read as discouraging
governmental landowners from holding their property open to the
public. This result would be plainly inconsistent with the stated
purpose of the RUS.
IV. THE LEGITIMATE SOLUTION: LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF THE
RUS
Although the Berman majority opinion suffers from
fundamental flaws in reasoning which could lead to results
contrary to the legislative intent behind the RUS, it nevertheless
raises two serious, interrelated problems with the RUS as it is
currently enacted. First, extending the limited liability provisions
221. Bucki v. Hawkins, 914 A.2d 491, 498 (R.I. 2007) ("In this case, the
defendant testified that a 'No Trespassing' sign was posted on her property, a
clear indication that she had not opened her land to the public for
recreational use.").
222. This is the stated purpose of the RUS. R.I. GEN. LAws § 32-6-1 (1994).
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of the RUS to state and municipal landowners has often led to
unjust results. 223 The Court has been faced with multiple cases
brought against governmental landowners by unsuspecting
individuals who suffered serious injuries on public land.22 4 In
each case, the RUS, when properly interpreted and applied,
operated to bar the individuals' claims.225  On numerous
occasions, the Court has expressed its difficulty in reaching very
troubling results based on classifying as trespassers those who use
governmental land for recreational purposes.226  Second, the
majority and dissent in Berman agreed the RUS provides no
incentive for state and municipal landowners to remedy
dangerous conditions on their lands after acquiring such
knowledge. 22 7
223. See Berman v. Sitrin, 991 A.2d 1038, 1044 n.8 (R.I. 2010) (explaining
the "unfortunately harsh consequences that flow from classifying those who
use public recreational facilities as trespassers."); id. at 1050 (explaining that
requiring actual discovery of Simcha before the duty arose would lead to a
"blatantly unjust result.").
224. See Berman, 991 A.2d at 1042 (twenty-three year old man on
honeymoon fell from Cliff Walk, suffering "severe spinal cord injury that
rendered him a quadriplegic"); Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035, 1037
(R.I. 2006) (woman attacked by a swarm of bees in a Providence park); Cruz
v. City of Providence, 908 A.2d 405, 406 (R.I. 2006) (two young boys suffered
serious injuries when the bicycle they were riding ran into a chain that
blended in with a chain link fence behind it); Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455,
456 (R.I. 2006) (while riding his bicycle in a public park, nine year old boy
rode his bicycle off of a cliff "and fell to the rocks below, sustaining severe and
permanent injuries.")
225. See Smiler, 911 A.2d at 1042 (affirming summary judgment granted
in favor of governmental landowner); Cruz, 908 A.2d at 407 (same); Lacey,
899 A.2d at 458-59 (same); see also Labedz v. State, 919 A.2d 415, 418 (R.I.
2007) (same); Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 714 (R.I. 2003) (same).
226. See Labedz, 919 A.2d at 417; Smiler, 911 A.2d at 1042; Cruz, 908
A.2d at 407 n.2; Lacey, 899 A.2d at 458.
227. Berman, 991 A.2d at 1051 (explaining that requiring actual discovery
of a particular person "would serve as a disincentive to the state and its
subdivisions to make necessary safety repairs to publicly owned and
taxpayer-financed recreational facilities, or to warn the unsuspecting and
innocent members of the public of known dangerous conditions."); id. at 1053
("We are not persuaded that the Legislature intended the RUS to serve as an
invitation to ignore known hazards while profiting from this major tourist
attraction where such danger is present."); id. at 1054 (Flaherty, J.,
concurring) ("A contrary holding in this case would provide an incentive to
landowners to be callous and altogether irresponsible with respect to the
safety of people entering upon their land for simple recreational pleasure, in
the face of danger known to the owner, but of which the recreational user is
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The Court is not alone in questioning the wisdom of statutes
that provide liability protection to governmental landowners who
hold their property open to the public for recreational purposes. A
fair number of courts and commentators have remarked that
extending the provisions of recreational use statutes to states and
municipalities appears unjust because a governmental body is in a
presumptively better position to compensate for injuries than are
individual plaintiffs who suffer injuries on government lands. 228
As the maintenance of many of these lands is funded by general
taxes, some authorities argue that an increase in taxes and/or the
purchase of liability insurance by the landowners are the most
efficient and just methods for ensuring injuries suffered by those
using public facilities do not go uncompensated. 229
totally unaware."); id. at 1055 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting) ("the RUS not only
protects the [C]ity from liability but also acts as a disincentive for the [C]ity
to implement any safety measures whatsoever."); see Smiler, 911 A.2d at
1042 ("We are additionally concerned about the protection of this state's
citizens, given that the statutory scheme does nothing to motivate
governmental landowners to make their properties safe.").
228. See Conway v. Town of Wilton, 680 A.2d 242, 253 (Conn. 1996)
(noting that "through taxes, municipalities are able to spread costs among
residents and thereby shift the burden of negligence away from the injured
citizen. Because municipalities essentially pass on the costs for all
recreational facilities or services to the citizenry in the form of taxes,
providing them with immunity would be at best anomalous."); Scrapchansky
v. Town of Plainfield, 627 A.2d 1329, 1340 (Conn. 1993) (Katz, J., dissenting)
(explaining that applying a recreational use statute "to municipalities
imposes too high a societal cost and serves no useful or intelligible purpose");
Chapman v. Pinellas Cnty., 423 So. 2d 578, 579-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(explaining that a recreational use statute should not be applied to
municipalities because "a county, [as opposed to a private landowner],
generally maintains its parks from available tax funds" and because a
municipality can "protect itself with liability insurance coverage in these
instances"); Joan M. O'Brien, Comment, The Connecticut Recreational Use
Statute: Should a Municipality Be Immune From Tort Liability?, 15 PACE L.
REV. 963, 994 (1995) (suggesting that a "municipality would be better able to
bear the burden of damages resulting from injury than an individual because
"any damage remedies resulting from negligence that are paid by the
municipality are spread among the taxpayers."); see also Robert A. Williams,
Note & Comment, Tough Choices Regarding Municipal Liability: The
Application of the Idaho Recreational Use Statute to Public Lands-Ambrose v.
Buhl Joint School District No. 412, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 185, 212-13 (1996)
(suggesting that the "availability and prevalence of insurance for
indemnification of tort liability" should be a factor to consider in determining
whether a recreational use statute should apply in any given case).
229. See Conway, 680 A.2d at 253 (taxes as a cost-spreading device);
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More persuasively, some commentators urge that a focus on
the reasonable expectations of the public highlights the injustice
of providing liability protection to governmental landowners. 230
This argument essentially posits that, because those members of
the public who come upon public recreational lands expect the
land to be maintained by the municipal or state landowner in a
reasonably safe condition, the public justifiably expects to have
some recourse in case of injury on such lands; therefore, it is
highly unjust to frustrate these expectations after the fact of
injury by providing governmental landowners with immunity from
liability. 231
Although criticisms of extending recreational use statutes'
protections to state and municipal landowners certainly have
some merit, it is nevertheless the prerogative of a democratically
elected legislature, and not that of a court, to change the language
of a statute. 232  While the Court may have been justifiably
frustrated with the General Assembly's persistent failure to take
any action to amend the RUS despite the Court's repeated
Chapman, 423 So. 2d at 579-80 (taxes and insurance as cost-spreading
devices); O'Brien, supra note 228 at 994 (taxes as a cost-spreading device); see
also Williams, supra note 228 at 212-13.
230. See Michael S. Carroll et al., Recreational User Statutes and
Landowner Immunity: A Comparison Study of State Legislation, 17 J. LEGAL
AsPECTS OF SPORT 163, 178 (2007) [hereinafter Carroll] (suggesting that "the
public also has a vested interest in holding landowners accountable for
negligent acts that lead to injuries of recreational participants"); O'Brien,
supra note 228 at 994 ("An individual using a [public] playground does so in
good faith that it is safe and that no danger exists or harm will result. The
public expects that the municipality will take care of its members.");
Renwand, supra note 211 at 279-80 (suggesting that the "reasonable
expectation of recreational users" should be a factor in determining whether
to extend protection under a recreational use statute to a particular piece of
land); Williams, supra note 228 at 212 (explaining that, "regarding public
playgrounds and inner-city improved parks, at least, public expectations
would probably be more in keeping with a negligence standard."); see also
McGhee v. Glenns Ferry, 729 P.2d 396, 400 (Idaho 1996) (Bistline, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting in a tongue-in-cheek manner that, if Idaho's
Recreational Use Statute is to be applied to public lands, the posting of
notices indicating the state's immunity should be required on all such lands
in order to provide members of the public with at least a modicum of
protection).
231. See Carroll, supra note 230 at 178; O'Brien, supra note 228 at 994;
Renwand, supra note 211 at 279-80; Williams, supra note 228 at 211-12.
232. See DeSantis v. Prelle, 891 A.2d 873, 881 (R.I. 2006); Simeone v.
Charron, 762 A.2d 442, 448 (R.I. 2000).
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exhortations for the Legislature to do so, the Court was not
justified in effecting the much desired change itself. No matter
how many times the Court urges the General Assembly to make a
change in an unfavorable law and no matter how many times the
General Assembly refuses to do so, the Court must remain
mindful that its "judicial role is to interpret and apply statutes
and not to legislate" and must refrain from substituting its own
policy judgments for those of the Legislature. 233 Legislative
amendment or repeal of the RUS remains the only legitimate
option for changing the application of the RUS to state and
municipal landowners.234
CONCLUSION
Faced once more with incredibly tragic facts and frustrated
with legislative inaction, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
233. Lacey v. Reitsma, 899 A.2d 455, 458 (R.I. 2006); see DeSantis, 891
A.2d at 881; Simeone, 762 A.2d at 448.
234. In addition to amending the RUS to exclude state and municipal
landowners from the definition of "owner," the General Assembly should also
consider omitting the "after discovering the user's peril" language from the
RUS. See R.I. GEN. STAT. § 32-6-5(a)(1) (1994). As mentioned earlier in this
Note, of the fifty jurisdictions that have recreational use statutes, only Rhode
Island's RUS contains the "after discovering the user's peril" phrase. See
supra note 190. While it is true that the language has particular significance
in treating land entrants who use property for recreational purposes as
trespassers, the RUS could likely operate just as effectively by providing an
exception to the limited liability provisions for "willful or malicious failure to
guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity ... "
R.I. GEN. STAT. § 32-6-5(a)(1) (1994). When the current exception containing
the "after discovering the user's peril" language has been correctly
interpreted, it has never operated to take away the RUS's grant of landowner
immunity. This is likely because the exception would only operate to forestall
immunity under a very specific factual scenario that would rarely, if ever,
arise: the landowner would need to discover a particular person in a position
of peril and then fail to warn or guard against a dangerous condition, use,
structure or activity. But see Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035, 1039 (R.I.
2006) (disagreeing with plaintiffs' contention that the RUS exception
containing the "after discovering the user's peril" language "is overly
prohibitive and logically impossible to invoke"). In any event, the more
problematic provision of the RUS is the one that includes the state and
municipalities under the definition of "owner." See R.I. GEN. STAT. § 32-6-2(3)
(Supp. 2010). Suffice it to say that, while multiple provisions of the RUS may
be in need of legislative reexamination, the General Assembly should first
rectify the more pressing problem with that statute: the extension of
landowner immunity to the state and municipalities.
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Berman v. Sitrin engaged in results-based reasoning that was
both contrary to the RUS and its own precedent and inimical to
the proper separation of governmental powers. While its decision
will allow a seriously injured individual to have his day in court,
the Court sacrificed sound principles of jurisprudence for zealous
advocacy of social policy. Viewed in this light, Berman could lead
to numerous scenarios not anticipated by the Court that would
undoubtedly be contrary to the legislative intent behind the RUS.
Although the RUS may be in need of serious changes, the General
Assembly is the only appropriate body to make any such change.
Although Simcha Berman's injury is undeniably tragic, inflicting
an injury to the integrity of the Rhode Island system of
government in order to provide individual redress - however
admirable this may seem - was unwarranted and ill-advised.
